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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
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MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN CONSUMER
FINANCE AND INVESTOR CONTRACTS
MICHAEL S. BARR*
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses are pervasive in consumer finan-
cial and investor contracts—for credit cards, bank accounts, auto loans,
broker-dealer services, and many others. These clauses often ill serve house-
holds. Consumers are typically presented with contracts on a “take it or leave
it” basis, with no ability to negotiate over terms. Arbitration provisions are
often not clearly disclosed, and in any event are not salient for consumers,
who do not focus on the importance of the provision in the event that a
dispute over the contract later arises, and who may misforecast the likelihood
of being in such a dispute. The lack of salience means that there is no
meaningful competition over arbitration provisions or likely any price effect.
Some arbitration proceedings lack procedural protections, and unbiased ar-
bitrator selection essential for fair outcomes. In addition, many arbitration
provisions contain “gag” rules barring disclosure of reasoning, evidence, or
outcomes. Moreover, arbitration clauses typically preclude consumers from
banding together in aggregated actions, which diminishes redress and weak-
ens deterrence. In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
which authorizes the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to prohibit or condition the use of
arbitration clauses in consumer finance and investment contracts, respec-
tively. It is well past time for these agencies to use this authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is widely used as an effective alternative to liti-
gation in a variety of contexts in the United States and in many
other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has touted the bene-
fits of arbitration over litigation, noting that “parties forgo the
procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to
realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs,
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert
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adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”1 These benefits
explain why arbitration is widely used, for example, in com-
mercial contracts and labor-management agreements. For
commercial actors, arbitration often has greater flexibility
than court proceedings, and has long been considered essen-
tial for cross-border transactions. For labor unions and man-
agement, resolving disputes through arbitration “minimize[s]
industrial conflict over worker grievances” and permits the
business to continue to run during dispute resolution.2
In addition to agreements between sophisticated parties,
arbitration clauses are now also nearly ubiquitous in American
consumer contracts. Consumers are typically presented with
contracts on a “take it or leave it” basis, with no meaningful
ability to negotiate over terms. Arbitration provisions are often
not clearly disclosed, and even when disclosed are not salient
for consumers, who do not focus on the importance of the
provision in the event that a dispute over the contract later
arises, and who may misforecast the likelihood of being in
such a dispute. As has been pointed out in a variety of con-
texts, non-salient contract terms that reduce consumer welfare
can be offered without offsetting effects on price.3 The lack of
salience at time of sale also means that there is no meaningful
competition to provide contracts without arbitration provi-
sions or with more consumer-friendly arbitration provisions.
Some arbitration proceedings lack procedural protections and
unbiased arbitrator selection processes essential for fair out-
comes. In addition, many arbitration provisions prohibit writ-
ten opinions and bar consumers from disclosing any informa-
tion about the arbitration proceedings or evidence backing
claims from such proceedings. Moreover, arbitration clauses
today typically preclude consumers from banding together in
aggregated actions. The lack of ability to aggregate claims may
diminish consumer access to effective redress, particularly for
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685
(2010).
2. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, The
Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION
25, 41 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
36919-nyb_11-4 spec iss Sheet No. 83 Side B      10/08/2015   12:19:55
36919-nyb_11-4 spec iss Sheet No. 83 Side B      10/08/2015   12:19:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYB\11-4sp\NYB409.txt unknown Seq: 4  6-OCT-15 17:45
796 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:793
small-value claims, and may diminish the deterrent value of
private litigation in enforcing legal norms.
This Comment focuses on the use of mandatory pre-dis-
pute arbitration clauses in a subset of consumer contracts—
those involving consumer finance and investor products and
services. Arbitration clauses are pervasive in financial con-
tracts—for credit cards, bank accounts, auto loans, broker-
dealer services, and many others. In the wake of the recent
financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.4 The Dodd-
Frank Act authorizes the new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB)5 and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)6 to prohibit or condition the use of arbi-
tration clauses in consumer finance and investment contracts,
respectively.
To date, neither the CFPB nor the SEC has taken regula-
tory action under this authority. This Comment outlines the
need for increased regulation over mandatory pre-dispute ar-
bitration clauses and suggests the need for key reforms. This
Comment begins by exploring arbitration clauses in consumer
finance and investor contracts, and then highlights the
problems caused by mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
A full treatment of potential solutions to these problems is be-





Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in
1925.7 The Supreme Court has ascribed this statute a broad
purpose, perceiving it as a “congressional declaration of a lib-
eral federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwith-
4. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-
Frank) § 1–1601, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2013).
5. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028. The author served as Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Financial Institutions, 2009–2010, and was responsible for
developing and working with Congress to enact Dodd-Frank, including the
relevant provisions discussed in this article.
6. Dodd-Frank Act § 921.
7. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
36919-nyb_11-4 spec iss Sheet No. 84 Side A      10/08/2015   12:19:55
36919-nyb_11-4 spec iss Sheet No. 84 Side A      10/08/2015   12:19:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYB\11-4sp\NYB409.txt unknown Seq: 5  6-OCT-15 17:45
2015] MANDATORY ARBITRATION 797
standing any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.”8 The Supreme Court has not only all but foreclosed
state regulation of arbitration agreements, but also has se-
verely limited access to the courts generally for consumers
seeking to challenge arbitration agreements.
The FAA provides that agreements to arbitrate “shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”9
Under this exception to enforceability, states tried to regulate
the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, but the
Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory carve out very
narrowly, noting that the FAA was enacted “[t]o overcome ju-
dicial resistance to arbitration.”10 State courts tried to use the
doctrine of unconscionability to set aside arbitration provi-
sions that violated the state’s procedural and substantive
norms. The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly upheld
the validity of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. The
Court has held that the FAA of 1925 preempts a wide swath of
state legislative and judicial efforts at regulation that, in the
Supreme Court’s view, interfered with the ability of commer-
cial firms to use mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts.11
The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA broadly to
uphold the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Even fraud in
the formation of the contract is not grounds for evading arbi-
tration; fraud must be found specifically in the formation of
the arbitration clause itself.12 Additionally, the arbitrators, not
the courts, determine the arbitrability of the underlying dis-
8. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
10. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
11. E.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
12. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–06
(1967) (“[T]he federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed
once it is satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not
in issue. Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitra-
tion clause itself—an issue which goes to the making of the agreement to
arbitrate—the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory
language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the
inducement of the contract generally.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Buckeye Check, 546 U.S. at 445–48.
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pute.13 Even where state courts have been inclined to explore
whether arbitration clauses are unconscionable, delegation
clauses allow parties to delegate the decision about an arbitra-
tion clause’s unconscionability to an arbitrator.14 Most contro-
versially, perhaps, the Supreme Court has ruled that arbitra-
tion clauses can exclude class action arbitration or litigation.15
The Supreme Court has also narrowly interpreted the
grounds for vacatur. Congress laid out in the FAA four circum-
stances under which a court can vacate an arbitral award:
(1) “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means,” (2) “where there was evident partiality or cor-
ruption in the arbitrators,” (3) “where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct,” and (4) “where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers.”16 Even the arbitrator’s misinterpretation or dis-
regard of the law is not grounds for vacatur.17 Instead, the
courts have developed the doctrine of manifest disregard of
law, which requires plaintiffs to overcome a high hurdle in the
form of a three-part test.18 To make matters even more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs, the parties are not allowed to supplement
13. E.g., Buckeye Check, 546 U.S. at 445–46 (noting that “as a matter of
substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from
the remainder of the contract” and that “unless the challenge is to the arbi-
tration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the
arbitrator in the first instance”); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (deciding that the primary power to decide
arbitrability belongs to either the arbitrators or the courts as the parties
agreed).
14. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2010).
15. AT&T Mobile LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). For a more
extensive discussion on the limitations on collective relief in arbitration, see
infra Part II.D.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002).
17. E.g., Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing L.P. v. Official Unsecured
Creditors’ Comm. of Bayou Grp., LLC, 491 F. App’x 201 (2d Cir. 2012);
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“But
as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract
and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”).
18. E.g., Goldman Sachs, 491 F. App’x at 204 (applying the three-part test:
(1) the court must determine whether the law that was allegedly ignored was
clear, and explicitly applicable to the matter before the arbitrators; (2) the
court must find that the law was improperly applied; and (3) the court must
find that the arbitrator possessed the subjective intent to disregard the law).
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grounds for vacatur in the contract,19 so the arbitration clause
itself cannot stipulate that mere legal error is sufficient to trig-
ger judicial review.
B. The Dodd-Frank Act’s New Authority to Regulate Arbitration
After the recent financial crisis, Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010.20 Bucking the trend towards greater enforcement of
arbitration clauses, Congress gave the new CFPB and the SEC
the respective authority to regulate and even prohibit the use
of arbitration clauses in consumer finance21 and investment
contracts.22 Thus, Congress has provided clear and unambigu-
ous legislative authority to these financial regulatory agencies
to regulate arbitration agreements in these contracts. To date,
however, neither the CFPB nor the SEC has taken regulatory
action under these broad authorities, but the CFPB has al-
ready flatly banned arbitration clauses in mortgage contracts
and for whistleblowers, as required under the Act.23
C. Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Finance and Investor
Contracts Today
1. Consumer Finance Contracts
The Dodd-Frank Act instructed the CFPB to “conduct a
study of . . . the use of agreements providing for arbitration
of any future dispute between covered persons and consumers
in connection with the offering or providing of consumer
financial products or services.”24 In December 2013, the
19. Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
However, parties may be able to alter the scope of judicial review in state
courts. Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (Cal. 2008).
20. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1–1601.
21. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028.
22. Dodd-Frank Act § 921.
23. The CFPB has issued rules flatly barring mandatory pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses in residential mortgage loan contracts and home equity lines
of credit, as required by Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank Act § 1414(e).
Whistleblowers are also protected under the Dodd-Frank Act against any re-
duction in their rights to legal redress pursuant to mandatory arbitration
provisions. Id. § 748 (providing protections to whistleblowers reporting to
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission); id. § 922 (providing protec-
tion to whistleblowers reporting to the SEC).
24. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(a).
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CFPB issued a preliminary report on pre-dispute arbitration
clauses,25 and followed up with a second study in March
2015.26
Arbitration clauses appear in contracts representing
50.2% of outstanding credit card loans, 58.8% of checking ac-
counts, and 83% of General Purpose Reloadable (GPR) pre-
paid cards.27 Currently, nearly all consumer financial contracts
include no-class arbitration provisions.28 Larger financial insti-
tutions are more likely to use arbitration clauses than smaller
ones.29 This holds true across all products and services the
CFPB studied. To illustrate, only 7.7% of banks include arbi-
tration clauses in checking account contracts, yet 44% of
checking accounts are subject to arbitration clauses.30 Cur-
rently, 53% of credit card loans contain arbitration clauses in
the agreement.31 However, this figure is artificially deflated be-
cause several large issuers settled an antitrust class action by
agreeing to remove arbitration clauses for a defined period. If
these issuers reinstate arbitration clauses once the period ex-
pires, then approximately 94% of outstanding credit cards will
25. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION 1028(A)
STUDY RESULTS TO DATE (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf. Industry push-
back has been understandably fierce, given the stakes. Many financial institu-
tions and law firms have vociferously criticized the CFPB’s report. See, e.g.,
Christine A. Scheuneman et al., CFPB’s Arbitration Study—A Warning to Con-
sumer Financial Service Companies, PILLSBURY (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.pills
burylaw.com/publications/cfpbs-arbitration-study-a-warning-to-consumer-fi-
nancial-service-companies (“In point of fact, however, while the tone of the
Study appears to be somewhat hostile to the use of arbitration clauses, an
objective reading of the research indicates that the conflict resolution system
that has developed is working well . . . ”); Michael Mallow et al., The CFPB’s
Unfair and Misleading Report on Arbitration, LAW360 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://
www.law360.com/articles/502651/the-cfpb-s-unfair-and-misleading-report-
on-arbitration.
26. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
§ 1028(A) (2015) [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY], available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-
to-congress-2015.pdf.
27. Id. § 3, at 19–28.
28. Id. § 1, at 10.
29. Id. § 3, at 19.
30. Id. § 3, at 25–26.
31. Id. § 2, at 9–10.
36919-nyb_11-4 spec iss Sheet No. 86 Side A      10/08/2015   12:19:55
36919-nyb_11-4 spec iss Sheet No. 86 Side A      10/08/2015   12:19:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYB\11-4sp\NYB409.txt unknown Seq: 9  6-OCT-15 17:45
2015] MANDATORY ARBITRATION 801
be subject to arbitration clauses.32 As another example, 81% of
prepaid cards, which are often used by lower-income consum-
ers, are subject to arbitration clauses.33
2. Broker-Dealer Agreements
As with its recommendations on consumer finance con-
tracts, the U.S. Department of the Treasury recommended in
its 2009 financial reform proposal that the SEC prohibit or
condition mandatory arbitration clauses in broker-dealer and
investment adviser agreements.34 As mentioned above, the
Dodd-Frank Act contains the authorization for such a prohibi-
tion or condition.35
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a
self-regulatory body governing broker-dealers, is responsible
for administering arbitration between broker-dealers and their
clients.36 The vast bulk of disputes between broker-dealers and
their clients involve arbitration, and, as with consumer arbitra-
tion clauses, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in investor-broker
contracts.37 Filed claims can end with an arbitration award, or
with a settlement achieved through direct negotiation or medi-
ation. Between 21–23% of cases were decided by arbitrators
from 2011 to 2015.38 During that same time period, 51–55% of
cases were settled via negotiation, and 7–10% via mediation.39
32. Id. § 2, at 12.
33. Id. § 3, at 27.
34. DEP’T OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDA-
TION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, at 72 (2009),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_
web.pdf.
35. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 921, 1028.
36. Arbitration Process, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAnd
Mediation/Arbitration/Process/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
37. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242
(1987) (holding that the claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and under RICO were arbitrable per the Federal Arbitration
Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 480
(1989) (holding that the claims under § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933
were arbitrable).
38. Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Arbitration
AndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
39. Id.
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Also during that period, the percentage of cases where the cus-
tomer was awarded damages decreased from 47% to 41%.40
There has long been some concern about the process by
which FINRA selects its arbitrators. For claims of $50,000 or
less, FINRA appoints one arbitrator.41 For claims for more
than $50,000, but less than $100,000, the parties will select and
FINRA will appoint one arbitrator, unless the parties agree
in writing to three arbitrators.42 For claims of more than
$100,000, the parties will select and FINRA will appoint three
arbitrators. In the latter two situations, FINRA generates a ran-
dom list of arbitrators from its rosters and sends that list to the
parties.43 Each party strikes from the list arbitrators they do
not want, and ranks the remaining choices. FINRA then com-
bines the parties’ rankings and appoints the highest ranked
available arbitrator from each list to serve on the panel. Critics
charge that the arbitrators on FINRA’s rosters are biased or
otherwise unqualified. Generally speaking, the pool of arbitra-
tors has close ties to the financial industry,44 lacks diversity,45
and is infrequently updated.46
40. Id.





44. See Matthias Rieker, FINRA to Limit Use of Arbitrators with Industry Ties,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052
702304104504579377300739589882; Mason Braswell, FINRA Approves Rule to
Redefine Public Arbitrators, INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.in
vestmentnews.com/article/20140213/FREE/140219936/finra-approves-rule
-to-redefine-public-arbitrators; see also Peter Robison, FINRA’s Arbitrators: Du-
bious, Asleep—Sometimes Dead, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-24/finra-seeks-reform-for-
broker-investor-arbitration-system (“Lawyers complain about . . . arbitrators
who are reluctant to make big rulings against the industry because they
won’t be asked back.”).
45. Mark Schoeff, Jr., PIABA Claims Arbitrator Bias—FINRA Lashes Back,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20141007/FREE/141009934/piaba-claims-arbitrator-bias-finra-lashes-back
(noting that most FINRA arbitrators are white males over sixty who hold
advanced degrees, which “puts them out of touch with the average inves-
tor”).
46. See Robison, supra note 44 (observing that FINRA has provided the
names of dead people as potential arbitrators).
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In response to critics, and industry concern about the po-
tential for SEC regulation, in June 2014, FINRA filed a pro-
posed rule change with the SEC to redefine “public arbitra-
tors.”47 Parties can choose whether they want public arbitra-
tors on their panel or not. Currently, FINRA allows people
who have been out of the securities industry for at least two
years to be classified as public arbitrators, as long as they have
spent fewer than twenty years total in the industry.48 The pro-
posed rule would require public arbitrators to be at least five
years out of industry, and permanently disqualify professionals
who worked longer than fifteen years total on behalf of indus-
try client.49 It also classifies as non-public attorneys, account-
ants, and other professionals who devote more than 20% of
their professional time to representing investors in securities
claims. In February 2015, the SEC approved the new rule.50
FINRA and the SEC have garnered praise for this move,51 but
its actual impact is not yet clear.
Recently, FINRA rejected a Schwab broker-dealer contract
on the grounds that it contained a bar on class action litiga-
tion.52 FINRA reasoned that its rules have long barred such
clauses, and that the FINRA Rule 2268(d), promulgated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is not prohibited by the
47. Mason Braswell, FINRA Approves Rule to Redefine Public Arbitrators,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20140213/FREE/140219936/finra-approves-rule-to-redefine-public-arbitra
tors; George H. Friedman, The Camel and the Last Straw or the Frog and the
Boiling Water: Pick Your Parable, SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR (Aug.
4, 2014), http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/camel-last-straw-frog-boiling-
water-pick-parable/.
48. Mark Schoeff, Jr., FINRA Seeks to Tighten Investor Dispute Rules,
INVESTMENTNEWS (June 18, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20140618/FREE/140619905/finra-seeks-to-tighten-investor-dispute-rules.
49. Id.
50. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Revisions to the
Definitions of Non-Public Arbitrator and Public Arbitrator, 80 Fed. Reg.
11695 (Mar. 4, 2015).
51. Mark Schoeff, Jr., FINRA Proposal on Public Arbitration Wins Praise,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20101003/REG/310039991/finra-proposal-on-public-arbitration-wins-praise.
52. Decision, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co. (Complaint
2011029760201) (FINRA Board of Governors, Apr. 24, 2014). FINRA does
not permit class action arbitration, but requires broker-dealer contracts to
permit class action lawsuits.
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Federal Arbitration Act.53 Some have speculated that FINRA
rejected the contract in order to avoid provoking the SEC into
using its Dodd-Frank Act authority to bar mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions altogether.54
3. Investment Advisers Agreements: No Mandatory Pre-Dispute
Arbitration
Investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty to their clients.55
Accordingly, the SEC has long taken the position, even prior
to the Dodd-Frank Act, that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses do not constitute a waiver of rights provided under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (including the right to choose
the forum, whether arbitration or adjudication, of dispute res-
olution), and that investment contracts should disclose this
fact.56 However, the SEC took these positions before several
Supreme Court decisions upheld arbitration clauses under the
federal securities laws, and a subsequent federal district court
citing those opinions upheld pre-dispute arbitration clause in
an advisory client agreement.57
The SEC now has the clear power under the Dodd-Frank
Act to prohibit or restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in these agreements going forward.58 At present, in-
vestment advisers, who deploy mandatory arbitration clauses,
53. Id.
54. Id. See Letter from Sen. Franken to the SEC, Office of Senator
Franken (Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=
press_release&id=2381; Mark Schoeff Jr., States Urge SEC to Chuck FINRA’s
Schwab Decision, INVESTMENTNEWS (May 4, 2013), http://www.investment
news.com/article/20130504/FREE/130509954/states-urge-sec-to-chuck-fin
ras-schwab-decision; Mark Schoeff Jr. & Mason Braswell, Seeing Writing on
Wall from FINRA, Schwab Throws in Towel on Class Action Lawsuit,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20140425/FREE/140429929/seeing-writing-on-wall-from-finra-schwab-
throws-in-towel-on-class; Susan Antilla, Schwab Case Casts Spotlight on Securities
Arbitration and Its Flaws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/schwab-case-casts-spotlight-on-securi-
ties-arbitration-and-its-flaws/?_r=0.
55. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92
(1963) (holding that § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 imposed a
fiduciary duty on investment advisers).
56. SEC, STAFF STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, at
44 (2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Dodd-Frank Act § 921.
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may operate in what some see as “gray area,” where they use
arbitration clauses at their own risk.59 Recently, however, the
SEC is reported to have pressured the Carlyle Group to re-
move a mandatory arbitration clause from its initial public of-
fer filing,60 suggesting that the SEC’s prior views that the fidu-
ciary duty standard already bars use of these agreements
has not changed. Moreover, the SEC is authorized under the
Dodd-Frank Act to harmonize the differing standards of care
for broker-dealers offering individualized investment advice,
and investment advisers, by requiring that the advice be in the
best interest of the investor.61 Under that approach, both bro-
ker-dealers (when providing individualized advice) and invest-
ment advisers would be prohibited from using mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clauses.
II.
PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN INVESTOR AND
CONSUMER FINANCE CONTRACTS
Proponents of arbitration often note the benefits to arbi-
tration over litigation, stressing the faster process, reduced
costs, and ability to choose expert adjudicators.62 For consum-
ers and investors, however, the many problems with manda-
tory pre-dispute arbitration clauses, often significantly out-
weigh these benefits. Consumers and investors are not making
any meaningful choice in agreeing to arbitration clauses. They
face a significant imbalance of power in bargaining, if any such
bargaining actually occurs. If a dispute does arise, consumers
and investors often proceed without the advice of counsel and
59. Suzanne Barlyn, Do Arbitration Pacts Go Against Clients’ Best Interests?,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 13, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-
02-13/news/sns-rt-us-arbitration-advisersbre91c1fj-20130213_1mandatory-ar
bitration-arbitration-agreements-federal-arbitration-law.
60. Carter Dougherty, Consumers May See New Limits on Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2012-05-21/consumers-may-see-new-limits-on-manda
tory-arbitration.
61. SEC, STAFF STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, at vi
(2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
62. E.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1775 (2010) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985); Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)).
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are faced with a process that is often inadequate and unfair.63
Furthermore, arbitration clauses often limit consumers’ and
investors’ access to collective redress, which meaningfully im-
pedes both recovery and deterrence.
A. Lack of Meaningful Consumer Consent
Even in the best of circumstances, it is hard to believe that
consumers give anything like meaningful consent to arbitra-
tion clauses.64 At the moment of signing a financial contract,
consumers are not focused on dispute resolution, but on the
financial product or service, or more likely on the underlying
thing they are trying to get done by obtaining the financial
product (for example, buying a car). Even if they were focused
on dispute resolution, they are unlikely to be able to forecast
the circumstances under which they would find themselves in
a dispute or to understand the ways in which the choice of
dispute resolution might influence the outcome. These prob-
lems are compounded by the complexity of arbitration clauses,
the lack of clear disclosure of the provisions (or the clear dis-
closure alongside many other “clear” disclosures that seem
more pertinent), and the limited ability of consumers to opt-
out of arbitration clauses. Given that consumers pay little or
no attention to arbitration clauses at the time of contracting,
competition does not drive firms to offer contracts without ar-
bitration clauses or with more consumer-friendly arbitration
clauses, and importantly, it is unlikely that these provisions
have a significant effect on the price of consumer financial
goods and services.65
1. Complexity of Arbitration Clauses
The CFPB analyzed the complexity of arbitration clauses
in credit card contracts by measuring clause length, readabil-
63. See infra Part II.C.
64. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 12 (2013) (noting that
consumers often do not even read boilerplate contracts and hypothesizing
seven reasons for that, including: a belief that they would not even under-
stand the terms even if they read them; a lack of awareness of being subject
to those terms; and a belief that it would be unenforceable if it were harm-
ful).
65. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1253 n.189 (2003).
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ity, and grade level.66 It found that the average arbitration
clause comprised 14.1% of words in the contract and consisted
of 1,108.8 words.67 The average grade level (which translates
total words, total sentences, and total syllables into the level of
education required to understand the text) for the arbitration
clauses averaged 15.6.68 This score indicates that the text is
best understood by those with some college education. In con-
trast, the average grade level for the remainder of the contract
was 11.6, which roughly corresponds to a high school-level
education.69 The meaning of delegation or anti-severability
clauses, for example, likely escapes most readers. The length
and complexity of arbitration clauses makes consumers less
likely to understand (or even to read) them.
2. Limited Consumer Ability to Opt-Out
Some arbitration clauses give consumers the ability to opt-
out of or reject the arbitration clause within a defined time
period, but they appear only in a small share of agreements,70
and their exercise is typically subject to restriction. To exercise
an opt-out, a consumer generally must submit a signed writing
by mail within thirty or sixty days.71 If there are multiple au-
thorized users on the account, they may each need to submit
written consent for the opt-out to be effective.72 Most consum-
ers are unlikely to exercise the opt-out options because of has-
sle factors and an incomplete understanding of the conse-
quences of their decisions.
3. Behavioral Factors
Even if consumer contracts better disclosed mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration provisions and permitted consumers to
opt-out, the problem of meaningful consumer consent would
remain. The use of arbitration clauses should be not measured
66. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 26, app. A, at 27–29.
67. Id. at 28 (To put that in perspective, that is two pages of single-spaced
text in 12-point Times New Roman font.).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 31 (Opt-out features appear in 27.3% of credit card agree-
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against some abstract notion regarding rational agents fully
understanding the implications of disclosed arbitration provi-
sions, but rather considered alongside empirical evidence re-
garding how actual human beings actually process information
and make decisions.73 The empirical evidence is clear that
consumers do not read or understand standard contract
terms.74 It is highly unlikely that consumers find the relevant
arbitration terms salient at the time of entering into the con-
tract. Consumers routinely underestimate the likelihood of fi-
nancial firms violating the law in a way that would affect
them.75 Moreover, they are highly unlikely to understand the
consequences of different choices of forum or law.
B. Imbalance of Power
A significant proportion of consumers go through the ar-
bitration process without legal representation, whereas compa-
nies never do. From 2010 to 2012, 53% of consumers had
counsel in American Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitra-
tions reviewed by the CFPB.76 This percentage drops to 42% in
debt collection proceedings.77 In contrast, companies “almost
always” retained outside or in-house counsel in both debt col-
73. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally
Informed Financial Services Regulation (New America Found., Asset Building
Program Pol’y Paper, 2008), available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=other; Michael S. Barr, Sendhil
Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Credit
Regulation, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT
REVISITED 170 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008); Barr,
Mullainathan & Shafir, The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, supra
note 3, at 25; Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir,
Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
POLICY 440 (Edlar Shafir ed., 2012).
74. Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anybody Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention
to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 (2014); Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 100–106 (2012).
75. See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally
Informed Regulation, in NO SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERI-
CANS 246, 257–61, 267–71, 274–76 (2012); Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on
Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 12–14 (2005).
76. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 26, § 5, at 28.
77. Id. app. A, at 74.
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lection and non-collection arbitrations.78 With lawyers repre-
senting companies, the purported benefits of an informal, low-
cost proceeding are largely dissipated.
Additionally, most arbitration clauses contain carve-outs
for small claims court.79 Small claims carve-outs exclude from
arbitration claims that could be or had been brought in small
claims court. These carve-outs are neutral in theory and have
the potential to benefit consumers significantly. However,
small claims court carve-outs are “significantly more likely” to
be used by credit card issuers to sue consumers, rather than
the other way around.80
C. Procedural Barriers to Full and Fair Adjudication
In addition to the problem of whether or not consumers
can be considered to have actually consented to arbitration,
there are procedural barriers within arbitration itself, as it is
often currently conducted, that may lead to substantively un-
fair outcomes.
1. Lack of Transparency
Arbitrators are not required to issue written opinions ex-
plaining their decisions.81 This lack of transparency creates
several problems for consumers. First, it prevents parties from
understanding how the arbitrator arrived at his decision.82
The absence of a written record also makes it harder for the
consumer to prove whether the arbitrator has displayed a man-
ifest disregard of law when seeking judicial review. Further-
more, this opacity precludes the application of stare decisis,
which in any event does not generally apply to arbitration.
Since arbitrators have no body of precedent to consult, arbitra-
78. Id. app. A, at 14.
79. Id. app. A, at 32 (finding that the incidence of small claims court
carve-outs was 59%, 62.7%, and 66.7% in contracts for checking accounts,
prepaid cards, and credit cards, respectively).
80. Id. app. A, at 15.
81. O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir.
1988) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
82. See Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Re-
quired in All Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the
Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 193–94 (1995).
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tion awards may suffer from unpredictability and lack of uni-
formity.
While arbitrators are of course free to issue written deci-
sions, institutional factors often weigh against them doing so.
Financial institutions retain control over drafting arbitration
clauses, and contracts for consumer financial products and
services will rarely require arbitrators to issue reasoned opin-
ions. Moreover, the American Arbitration Association
Commercial Rules and the Uniform Arbitration Act contain a
presumption that a reasoned opinion shall not be issued un-
less the parties so require.83
Moreover, arbitration clauses often contain various forms
of confidentiality or “gag” rules that prevent consumers from
disclosing arbitration outcomes, or from revealing evidence
used in the arbitration process, or from otherwise disparaging
companies with whom they are in dispute. As a result, arbitra-
tion may result in hiding information from the public even
when widespread and serious legal violations may have oc-
curred that gave rise to the arbitration proceeding.
2. Selection of Arbitrators
The ability of the parties’ to choose their own arbitrator is
touted as an advantage because parties can theoretically
choose a mutually acceptable, impartial person or panel pos-
sessing relevant expertise. Commonly, the arbitration clause
stipulates an arbitration organization such as the AAA, which
is currently the predominant administrator for consumer arbi-
tration about credit cards, checking accounts, and GPR pre-
paid cards.84 The arbitration organization then determines the
pool of prospective arbitrators, if not the actual arbitrator(s).85
Professional arbitrators can be preferable to judges due to
their subject-area expertise, and they are generally bound by
codes of conduct, as are AAA arbitrators, to ensure neutrality.
However, arbitrators may be biased, if they are affiliated with
the industry that is the subject of the dispute. Even when arbi-
83. Abraham J. Gafni, Written Opinions in Arbitration Aren’t a Given, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.adroptions.com /pdfs/08SEPT-
WrittenOpinions_in_ArbitrationArent_ a_Given.pdf.
84. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 26, § 2, at 34–35.
85. Id. § 2, at 40.
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trators are truly neutral, the perception of unfairness may lead
consumers to lose faith in the process.
There have been notorious examples of highly biased ar-
bitration organizations, such as the National Arbitration
Forum (NAF), that were essentially working on behalf of debt
collection agencies, and offering “neutral” arbitration services
that were in the interests of the debt collection firms.86 NAF
has since been forced to terminate its consumer arbitration
services. The current market leader in consumer arbitrations,
AAA, has voluntarily agreed not to hear firm-initiated debt col-
lection cases on the grounds that its own inquiry into such ar-
bitrations gave it serious doubt about the fairness of the pro-
cess.87
A recent study of securities arbitration found that the ar-
bitrator’s background had a significant impact on arbitration
outcomes.88 For example, industry experience tends to de-
crease arbitral awards for claimants. The influence of arbitra-
tor background on outcomes is tempered, however, when
claimants are represented by counsel in the arbitral proceed-
ings.89
3. Limits on Damages
Arbitration clauses can limit consumers’ ability to recover
damages in a number of ways. Oftentimes, arbitration clauses
preclude the award of punitive damages or consequential
damages, or both.90 Alternatively, they may specify strict guide-
lines for the arbitrator to follow in calculating the award.91
Some type of limitation on damages appears in 15% of credit
card contracts with arbitration clauses and over 60% of both
86. See, e.g., State v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550,
2009 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 340 (Minn. Dist. Ct., July 17, 2009).
87. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 26, app. A, at 65–66. See
also Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Con-
sumer Debts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Richard W.
Naimark, Senior Vice President, American Arbitration Association).
88. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Influence of Arbitrator Background and
Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 43 (2014).
89. Id.
90. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 26, § 2, at 47.
91. Id.
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checking account and prepaid card contracts with arbitration
clauses.92
D. Collective Redress and the Interplay Between Public and
Private Enforcement
1. The Role of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses in
Thwarting Efforts for Collective Redress
Arbitration clauses increasingly bar access to collective re-
dress.93 Class proceedings are essential for effective redress of
many small value legal claims.94 Class action arbitration, like
class action litigation, solves the problem that occurs when a
company’s practice defrauds many people, but individual law-
suits would be impracticable because each consumer could
only hope to recover a relatively minor amount. Though the
amount is negligible for each individual, the error adds up to a
significant windfall for the company, and the lack of collective
redress diminishes the deterrent value of private litigation in
shaping corporate behavior.
For those reasons, the California Supreme Court struck
down waivers of class arbitration in adhesive contracts as un-
conscionable, in the Discover Bank rule.95 The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, held in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion that the
FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule, with the result that
class arbitration waivers are not permitted to be ruled uncon-
scionable under state law, at least not under similar facts and
circumstances.96 The Court reasoned that class-wide arbitra-
tion sacrifices “the principal advantage of arbitration—its in-
formality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and
more likely to generate procedural morass than final judg-
92. Id. § 2, at 47–49.
93. Id. § 1, at 10 (“Nearly all the arbitration clauses studied include provi-
sions stating that arbitration may not proceed on a class basis . . . . Although
these terms effectively preclude all class proceedings, in court or in arbitra-
tion, some arbitration clauses also expressly waive the consumer’s ability to
participate in class actions in court.”).
94. See, e.g., Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 388, 344 (7th Cir.
1997) (noting the importance of aggregating claims in transforming “rela-
tively paltry recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attor-
ney’s) labor” to bring).
95. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 156–58, 160
(2005).
96. AT&T Mobile LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
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ment.”97 Concepcion has been widely decried for its negative im-
pact on public access to justice.98
2. Reduced Private Enforcement
Class proceedings are critical components of the mix of
public and private enforcement of many legal norms. Many
consumer financial protection statutes contemplate that class
proceedings will be conducted to enforce those norms.99
“[W]e have come to assume, quite correctly, that private actors
will be the frontline enforcers in actions redressing broadscale
securities fraud, consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices,
. . . and many other areas.”100 Penalty levels set by statute nec-
essarily contemplate a given mix of public and private enforce-
ment. Thus, if consumer class relief were not available, penalty
levels (and the extent of public enforcement) would need to
be increased to achieve the same overall level of enforce-
ment.101
The traditional use of private litigation to enforce individ-
ual rights in the United States has become increasingly supple-
mented with public enforcement. Recently, the United States
“increasingly relies on states attorneys general, federal prose-
cutors, agencies, and legislative compensation to compensate
victims on a massive scale” as reformers have moved for a focus
97. Id. at 1751.
98. See, e.g., Frank Blechschmidt, Comment, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion and the Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 541, 567–70 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703,
720–25 (2012); Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer
for Consumer Claims After the Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 466–69 (2012).
99. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2012); Equal
Credit Opportunity Act § 706, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (2012); Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act § 813, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012); Electronic Funds
Transfer Act § 916, 15 U.S.C. § 1693m (2012); Credit Repair Organizations
Act § 409, 15 USC § 1679g (2012).
100. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 625–26
(2012).
101. David Noll, Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers Univ. Sch. of
Law–Newark, Contract Procedure, Regulatory Breakdown, Remarks at New
York University School of Law Conference, The Future of Class Action
Litigation: A View from the Consumer Class (Nov. 7, 2014) (noting that Congress
controls the amount of enforcement by adjusting the incentives to litigate).
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on victims’ rights.102 Although it is true that there has been an
emerging trend in America towards increased public enforce-
ment, private litigation is still an essential enforcement mecha-
nism.103 It is, moreover, an important check on lax public en-
forcement.104 Notably, even many European countries, long
considered to be focused on civil enforcement over private liti-
gation, have adopted increasingly expansive collective redress
procedures. In fact, there has been a “convergence” in how
the United States and the European countries have attended
to collective redress.105 This demonstrates that the ideal mix of
public and private enforcement is fluid and can change over
time. However, Congress has legislated against a backdrop of
enforcement policies, and has established many privately ac-
tionable statutory schemes that depend on individuals bring-
ing suit, individually and collectively, for enforcement.106
III.
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN OTHER CONTEXTS
The use of arbitration agreements in other contexts in-
forms the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. Arbitration agreements in the labor con-
text are individually negotiated between sophisticated parties,
and are highly touted as beneficial for both sides. Arbitration
agreements are also used by commercial actors, but, surpris-
ingly, much less used for commercial disputes by the very same
firms that impose mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments on consumers.
102. Adam S. Zimmerman, The Convergence of Global Settlements,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 1, 2012), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs blawg/
2012/02/the-convergence-of-global-settlements.html.
103. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 100, at 624–26.
104. LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE: RECAPTURING THE
LOST GENIUS OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY (2012).
105. Zimmerman, supra note 102 (noting that “[t]he ‘bottom up’ ap-
proach of the United States to aggregate litigation appears to be converging
with other countries’ ‘top-down approach.’”).
106. See, e.g., Blechschmidt, supra note 98, at 567–70; Gilles & Friedman,
supra note 100, at 624–25; Sternlight, supra note 98, at 720–25; Tracey &
McGill, supra note 98, at 466–69.
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A. Labor Agreements
Collective bargaining agreements often feature
mandatory arbitration provisions. Both labor unions and man-
agement are sophisticated parties who individually negotiate
for these provisions. Both parties believe that dispute resolu-
tion through arbitration causes less friction than litigation.107
Additionally, both parties have more trust in arbitrators that
the parties have selected themselves and tend to have more
expertise in labor relations than judges with only general
knowledge.108 Labor unions and management also have simi-
lar goals in maintaining a strong and competitive business,
and so both stress “a conflict resolution process that would
keep businesses running and avoid losses in productivity and
employment.”109
Unlike consumer and investor contracts, collective bar-
gaining agreements are individually negotiated between so-
phisticated parties with equal bargaining power.110 As such,
the specific details that are commonly found in these labor
agreements can inform what should be enforced in the con-
sumer context. One of the reasons that labor unions and man-
agement negotiate for arbitration in collective bargaining
agreements in the first place is the ability to choose the arbitra-
tor.111 One key safeguard for unionized workers is that “un-
ions and management repeatedly arbitrate and jointly select
the arbitrator.”112 Joint selection helps to ensure a neutral ar-
bitrator,113 and repeated arbitrator incentivizes the arbitrator
“to perform consistently without favoring one party over the
107. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2, at 55.
108. See, e.g. Julius H. Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New
York Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147, 150 (1921) (“Presumably men of commercial
experience today need no guardianship for determining, at the time of mak-
ing a contract, whether they prefer the opinion of their own trade upon
technical questions, or the hazardous judgment of a jury of their vicinage.”).
109. Id. See also Allison Anderson, Labor and Commercial Arbitration: The
Court’s Misguided Merger, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2013) (comparing the
purpose of labor arbitration which is to “stabilize the workplace by prevent-
ing work stoppages” and the purpose of other arbitration which is as a re-
placement for litigation).
110. See, e.g., Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2, at 55–56.
111. Id. at 55.
112. Anderson, supra note 109, at 1255–56.
113. Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, Paper 4403,
FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 916, 929–30 (1979). Compare this with the con-
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other.”114 Instead, labor unions and management use the out-
comes to renegotiate the terms of their agreements if they
want future outcomes to differ from the arbitrator’s deci-
sion.115 Additional safeguards include: a duty on both parties
to share information116 and a duty on the union to fairly re-
present its workers.117 The National Labor Relations Act re-
quires employers to share information throughout the entire
arbitration process. In labor arbitrations, arbitrators often
write opinions, which allows for future arbitrators and future
parties to explore patterns in prior adjudications.118
B. Commercial Actors
Notably, the same commercial actors that inflict manda-
tory pre-dispute arbitration agreements on their consumers do
not choose to bargain for these agreements in other contracts.
One study found that with large public corporations over 75%
of the studied consumer agreements imposed mandatory arbi-
tration of disputes, yet less than 10% of their “negotiated non-
consumer, non-employment contracts” included arbitration
clauses.119 The authors concluded that “[t]he absence of arbi-
tration provisions in the great majority of negotiated business
contracts suggests that companies value, even prefer, litigation
as the means for resolving disputes with peers.”120 They fur-
ther noted that “[t]he systematic eschewing of arbitration
clauses in business-to-business contracts also casts doubts on
the corporations’ asserted beliefs in the superior fairness and
efficiency of arbitration clauses.”121 It appears, therefore, that
at least some commercial actors may be using arbitration
clauses against consumers for the strategic advantages it pro-
vides. Those strategic advantages are diminished, however,
sumer and investor context, in which the firm may be a repeat player in
arbitration whereas the consumer may only arbitrate the one time.
114. Id. at 1556. This author also notes that the joint bargain for the par-




118. Getman, supra note 113, at 920–21.
119. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Emily Sherwin, Arbitra-
tion’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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when dealing with other sophisticated parties. This is shown in
the revealed preferences of large companies, which choose ar-
bitration with consumers, but prefer litigation for business-to-
business disputes.
CONCLUSION
Although arbitration can provide some benefits over liti-
gation in a variety of commercial contexts, consumers are
often subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses that
diminish their legal protections, reduce recoveries, and atten-
uate deterrence. It can hardly be said that consumers mean-
ingfully consent to such arrangements, and so it has often
been left to courts to police these provisions through doctrines
such as unconscionability. Over the years, the Supreme Court
has significantly cabined the ability of courts to exercise
this critical oversight role. Recently, however, Congress has
stepped in through the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act to pro-
vide the authority for the CFPB and SEC to prohibit or condi-
tion the use of arbitration agreements in consumer finance
and investor contracts, respectively.
The CFPB and SEC should use this new authority to pro-
hibit or condition contractual requirements on consumers
and investors to arbitrate. At a minimum, significant condi-
tions on arbitration agreements are needed. These include
both up-front protections, including prominent disclosures
and easy methods to opt-out of arbitration at any time, as well
as protections embedded in arbitration processes that are used
in consumer finance and investor contract disputes, to ensure
that they provide a fair and efficient method for resolving
claims. In addition, the agencies should bar provisions in con-
sumer finance and investor contracts that limit the ability to
seek collective relief or otherwise inhibit full redress of con-
sumer and investor claims. While this short Comment does not
provide the space necessary to work out these proposals in de-
tail, my forthcoming work will explore the parameters of these
reforms.
